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Most academics agree that emotions and moods are related but distinct phenomena. The 
present study assessed emotion-mood distinctions among a non-academic population and compared 
these views with distinctions proposed in the literature. Content analysis of responses from 106 
participants identified 16 themes, with cause (65% of respondents), duration (40%), control (25%), 
experience (15%) and consequences (14%) the most frequently cited distinctions. Among 65 
contributions to the academic literature, eight themes were proposed, with duration (62% of 
authors), intentionality (41%), cause (31%), consequences (31%) and function (18%) the most 
frequently cited. When the eight themes cited by both academics and non-academics were rank 
ordered, approximately 60% overlap in opinion was evident. A data-derived summary of emotion-
mood distinctions is provided. These data should prove useful to investigators interested in 






The terms emotion and mood represent a conundrum for psychologists. Although the words 
are frequently used interchangeably, most academics agree that the constructs they represent are 
closely related but distinct phenomena. Distinctions between them are clouded, in part, because an 
emotion and a mood may feel very much the same from the perspective of an individual 
experiencing either. Further, as observed by Ekman (1994), language does not always represent 
psychological reality. Because we are able to say that emotion and mood are different does not 
mean that they are, and any difference may be purely semantic. Therefore, emotion and mood may 
be different words for the same construct or different words for different constructs. Either way, it is 
incumbent on psychologists to attempt to clarify the exact nature of emotion and mood, their 
relationship with one another, and their respective relationships with other psychological 
phenomena.  
The rationale for pursuing agreed distinctions between emotion and mood is compelling for 
at least two reasons. First, conceptual clarity is a bedrock of science and several theorists have noted 
the existing confusion in terminology (e.g., Alpert & Rosen, 1990; Batson, Shaw, & Oleson, 1992; 
Bless & Schwarz, 1999; Ekman & Davidson, 1994; Lormand, 1985; Ketai, 1975). Perhaps as a 
result of this confusion, it is apparent that much of the research in the area of emotion and mood has 
produced equivocal findings. For example, Parkinson, Totterdell, Briner and Reynolds (1996), 
described the research into mood and memory as “vast and inconclusive” (p. 97); a situation 
perhaps caused by varied conceptualization and measurement of the mood construct. In other 
words, some researchers may have been investigating the emotion-memory link and others the 
mood-memory link, erroneously assuming the two relationships to be the same. 
Second, a clear distinction between emotion and mood would also be valuable from a 
therapeutic perspective. If the emotion of anxiety is in some way distinct from an anxious mood, 
then the difference may manifest itself as distinct causes or consequences of the two states and 
therefore may be sensitive to different therapeutic interventions. For example, if, as has been 
argued, emotion biases behavior whereas mood biases cognition (Davidson, 1994), emotion-
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regulation strategies might focus on changing behavioral responses to environmental stressors, such 
as withdrawing from stressful situations rather than dealing with them, while mood-regulation 
strategies might focus on cognitive processes, such as encouraging positive rather than negative 
self-talk. Similarly, if emotions have specific causes but moods do not, as proposed by Ekman 
(1999), an effective emotion-regulation strategy may be to identify and re-appraise the cause; while 
an effective mood regulation strategy may be to moderate the resultant feelings by, for example, 
listening to music or engaging in physical exercise (Thayer, 1996).  
It is apparent that the distinguishing characteristics of emotion and mood have already 
received much attention in the literature. Ekman and Davidson (1994) noted that “most researchers 
interested in affect insist on distinguishing between them” (p. 94), but emphasized that the criteria 
used to achieve this distinction vary considerably
1
. A broad range of distinctions is proposed, 
ranging from physiological and neurological through to behavioral and social criteria. Distinctions 
are often based on the researcher‟s particular area of interest: a psycho-physiologist such as 
Panksepp (1994) may choose to differentiate the two by comparing the respective neural or somatic 
correlates of each; whilst a psycho-linguist such as Wierzbicka (1992) may choose to emphasize 
semantic distinctions in everyday language. Certainly, it seems likely that emotion and mood are 
distinct along more than one criterion, and it is easy to see how a difference in their respective 
underlying physiological processes would lead to differences in phenomenal experience, in turn 
leading to differences in expression, behavior, and linguistic descriptions of the two states.  
A significant feature of emotion-mood distinctions in the literature is that none of them, 
despite their intuitive appeal and complexity, are supported by published data
2
. Even traditionally 
data-rich sub-disciplines, such as neurology and psychophysiology, appear to make relatively 
arbitrary distinctions. That is, although objective neurological indices are used to distinguish 
between two states labeled as emotion and mood, the labels themselves are operational definitions 
                                            
1
 Arguably to avoid addressing the distinction between emotion and mood, many psychologists refer instead to affect, a term that tends not to be used 
in everyday language to describe human experience and one that was not mentioned once by any of the 106 respondents in the present study. The 
Oxford English Dictionary (Sykes, 1982) recognizes it as a term used only in psychology, and Dennett (1991, p. 45) described it as “the awkward 
term [for emotion] favored by psychologists.” 
2 Schimmack and Siemer (1998) have addressed the question empirically, although this paper is as yet unpublished. 
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based on the opinion of the researchers as to what constitutes an emotion and a mood, as opposed to 
any “real” occurrence of either emotion and mood per se (see Searle, 1999 for a discussion of the 
language-reality debate). 
One potential yet unexplored avenue of empirical investigation into the emotion-mood 
distinction is to examine what have been termed folk psychology or common sense theories; that is, 
theories based on “the assumptions, hypotheses and beliefs of ordinary people about behavior and 
mental experience” (Colman, 2001, p.283). Many emotion researchers have emphasized the 
scientific value of such theories (e.g., Lazarus, 1999; Levenson, 1994). Lazarus, for example, stated 
that “If we believe that emotions result from the way people construe and evaluate events, the most 
useful theory [of emotion] will be based on those construals and evaluations…if formulated 
appropriately, folk theory can be evaluated by observation, which is the hallmark of science, just as 
readily as can any other theory” (p. 61).  
We propose that folk psychology theories relating to emotion and mood offer much 
potential to further the academic study of the two constructs. In fact, in view of the limited progress 
of traditional empirical approaches, such an approach is not only warranted but may be long 
overdue. There are at least two further reasons for adopting a folk psychology approach to the 
present research question. First, all humans not suffering from neurological impairment have access 
to, and some degree of ability to communicate to others, the subjective experience of emotions and 
moods. They may experience what they call emotions in some situations, and what they call moods 
in others, and therefore may be able to describe perceived differences between the two. Thus, when 
canvassing people for their opinions on emotion and mood, we are not asking for their opinion 
about an abstract psychological problem, such as the nature of consciousness, we are asking them 
about a subject of which they may have intimate knowledge.  
Second, most English-speaking people use the words emotion and mood in everyday 
language, where for example the phrases “he‟s a very moody person” and “he‟s a very emotional 
person” could have distinct meanings. For example, Damasio (1999) proposed that a moody person 
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is one whose reactions to an event are likely to be more consistent with the (usually negative) nature 
of his or her mood than with the actual nature of the event. Such a person in a hostile mood, for 
example, is unlikely to be friendly even in response to a friendly greeting. Further, a moody person 
is often defined as being “sullen and gloomy” (Sykes, 1982) and is “usually prone to bad temper or 
depression” (Parkinson et al., 1996, p.3). An emotional person, on the other hand, is one who “often 
reacts in a manner consistent with the nature of the immediate event or situation, whether positive 
or negative” (Alston, 1967; Sykes, 1982) but in an intense even extreme way; someone who 
perhaps cries while watching a sad film, or who is easily and demonstrably angered by minor 
irritations. Moreover, someone who does not feel “in the mood” is generally disinclined to do 
something (Lormand, 1985; Ortony et al., 1987), possibly for reasons of which he or she is not fully 
aware, perhaps relating to general perceptions of available physiological resources, ability or 
urgency. In contrast, someone who is “too emotional” to do something, has some more pressing 
concern, perhaps relating to a significant event or situation in his or her life such as a family 
bereavement or illness. 
In the present study, we adopted a folk psychology perspective for the purpose of 
investigating non-academic distinctions between emotion and mood and then compared the 




The present study adopted a simple research question; “What is the difference between 
emotion and mood”. To answer this question, we sought to recruit participants who could provide 
data-rich replies in sufficient quantity for reliable evaluation of the consensus among their 
responses. A sampling method described by Fife-Schaw (2000) as “snowballing” (p. 99) was used. 
In snowball sampling, a network of participants is self-generating, in that each participant is asked 
to recommend others who may also be able to provide data-rich responses to the question of 
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interest. This strategy produced a sample of participants who were mostly educated to degree level 
or above. As there is no reason to suspect that well-educated and less well-educated individuals 
conceptualize the distinction between emotion and mood differently, this demographic 
characteristic was considered to be advantageous, given that well educated participants may be able 
to express emotion-mood distinctions more eloquently.  
Participants were 106 individuals (male = 55, female = 51, M = 30 yr., SD = 4.4 yr.) from a 
variety of professions ranging from artists, musicians and photographers (n = 8); athletes, including 
four Olympic medallists (n = 13); business consultants (n = 9); company directors (n = 6); medical 
doctors (n = 4); engineers (n = 3); sports coaches (n = 13); lawyers and barristers (n = 4); business 
managers (n = 29); military personnel (n = 4); secretaries (n = 7); students (n = 4) and teachers (n = 
2). All participants lived and worked in the United Kingdom. Highest academic achievement of 
participants ranged from O-level (n = 5), A-level (n = 8), Diploma (n = 1), University Degree (n = 
75), Masters Degree (n = 15), MBA (n = 1) to PhD (n = 1).  
Pilot Study 
It was important to limit any bias inherent in the question without limiting the richness of 
the responses. For example, the question “What is the difference between emotion and mood?” 
clearly infers that there is a difference between the two. However, a less leading but closed 
question, such as “Is there a difference between emotion and mood” would likely yield more “Yes” 
or “No” answers. To assess these effects, a pilot study was carried out with 10 participants, who 
were asked the following two questions: Question 1 “Is there a difference between emotion and 
mood?” and Question 2 “What do you believe is the difference between emotion and mood?” 
Participants were canvassed for their views on the clarity of the instructions and questions. 
Supporting our original suspicions, participants believed that respondents to Question 1 may be 
tempted simply to write “No” or “I don‟t know”, whereas respondents to Question 2 were more 
likely to provide a longer response. Although participants stated that they did not feel that Question 
2 was in any way biased, they proposed that some form of qualifying statement in the 
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accompanying instructions would ensure that this was also the case for all future participants (see 
below).  
Measures  
Mood-emotion distinctions were assessed by asking participants a single, open-ended 
question: “What do you believe is the difference between an emotion and a mood?” with qualifying 
instructions being: a) “There is no right or wrong answer, please simply write down your personal 
view”, b). “Please do not ask friends or colleagues for their opinion to assist you in deciding your 
answer”, c) “Please do not use any form of reference text to help you answer the question (e.g., 
dictionaries, text books, internet, etc.)”, d) “Please feel free to use any examples or experiences you 
may have to illustrate your answer”, e) “Make your answer as short or as long as you like”, and f) 
“The question asks for the difference between two types of human feeling. If you do not think that 
there is a difference, please simply state that opinion”. Demographic information relating to 
occupation, education, and any background or experience in academic, counseling, or clinical 
psychology, was also requested.  
Procedure 
The questionnaire, including a request to nominate other participants, was distributed in 
electronic format to the participants. Originally, the aim was to survey a larger number of 
respondents. However, an initial analysis of the first 106 participants showed clear signs of 
saturation in the data, whereby increasing numbers of respondents yielded no increase in the 
number of themes or the richness of their description. Thus, it was decided to limit the number of 
participants to this initial group. This strategy is supported by Coyle (2000), who proposed that 
although “it is important to gather sufficient text to discern the variety of discursive forms that are 
commonly used when speaking or writing about the research topic” there is “no necessity to sample 
from a large number of people” (p. 256); and by Kvale (1996), who noted that increasing sample 
sizes in qualitative research may reduce the quality of data and lead to data management problems.  
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Responses from participants with background experience or education in psychology were 
removed from the data set prior to analysis. This was to ensure that in attempting to determine 
commonalities between academic and non-academic perspectives of the emotion-mood distinction, 
no participants could fall into both groups. 
Data Analysis 
Four analyses were conducted: (a) content analysis of participants‟ responses; (b) content 
analysis of the academic literature; (c) quantitative comparison of analyses (a) and (b); and (d) 
qualitative comparison of analyses (a) and (b). Content analysis is a technique for analyzing 
qualitative data, for example, by use of frequency counts of words, statements, or concepts. Jackson 
(1995) described the purpose of content analysis as:  
To synthesize specific ideas expressed by individuals into meaningful themes which link 
similar ideas into a set of integrated concepts. Guiding the process is a search for patterns of 
similarity across the raw data themes, to group similar ideas together, and to progress from 
the specific to the more general over two or more stages. The process involves comparing 
and contrasting each theme at a particular level with all other themes, uniting themes with 
similar meaning and separating themes with different meanings. (p. 141) 
Analyses were carried out in three distinct stages. The first stage was to identify raw data 
items, such as “Mood is a long-term state of mind/being, emotion is a short-term feeling” and 
separate these from responses not directly related to the present research question, such as 
“Emotions and moods are felt by all humans.” The second stage was to group together raw data 
items with similar meaning into higher order themes. For example, the items “Mood is a long-term 
state of mind/being, emotion is a short-term feeling” and “An emotion is experienced for an instant, 
a mood can last for ages” both relate to a proposed temporal difference between emotion and mood 
and were grouped under the dimension duration. The third stage was to group higher order themes 
into general dimensions. For example, the themes duration, intensity, stability, timing and clarity 
were grouped under the dimension structure, as they all describe the structure of an emotion or a 
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mood in space and time, analogous perhaps to the way a sound can be described in terms of its 
duration, volume, pitch, and rhythm.  
Our initial plan for the analyses was to analyze and classify non-academic responses with no 
reference to any a priori assumptions. However, this proved problematic; that is, our knowledge of 
the mood and emotion literature led us to classify many of the responses in line with the proposals 
in that literature, of which we were all cognizant
3
. For example, the statement “my emotions are 
always much stronger than my moods” indicated to us that the respondent was using the criterion of 
intensity, a criterion frequently proposed in the literature to distinguish emotion from mood (i.e., the 
term stronger was interpreted as relating to the intensity of feeling). However, it may be argued that 
an individual not familiar with the literature may have interpreted the word stronger in a different 
manner, for example, indicating that emotions are harder to modify (i.e., an engineer may express or 
interpret the word strength in terms of resilience to imposed stress), or even that emotions endure 
longer than moods (i.e., an athlete may express or interpret the word strength in terms of persistence 
in the face of adversity). Therefore, many different interpretations of even a simple nine-word 
statement may be possible. Such issues, to an extent, lie at the heart of psychology; language rarely 
represents an unambiguous fact, and consequently any claim regarding the validity of the analysis 
presented below in relation to an alternative analysis may be unjustifiable, an issue addressed 
further in the section on trustworthiness below.  
Although a significant number of respondents‟ views concurred with those evident in the 
academic literature, a significant number did not. Consequently, two analysis strategies, one 
deductive and one inductive, were used; data items were either classified into predetermined higher 
order themes derived from the literature, such as duration, intensity and stability (i.e., structural 
analysis, Tesch, 1990), or data were classified into themes not evident in the literature which were 
allowed to emerge (i.e., interpretational analysis, Tesch, 1990). 
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 It should be noted that the presentation of the non-academic results before the academic results merely reflects the order in which the actual 
analyses themselves were carried out, and should not be seen to imply that the initial analysis was carried out with no knowledge of the academic 




Trustworthiness of the analysis of non-academic responses 
The reliability of any interpretational analyses is a thorny issue. Smith (1995) warned of the 
potential pitfalls of trying to evaluate qualitative research “in terms of the canons of validity that 
have evolved for the assessment of quantitative research, since these have different epistemological 
priorities and commitments” (p. 192). Smith argued that qualitative methods will be found wanting 
if judged by such criteria (e.g., a numerical indication of inter-rater reliability), an argument 
supported by Denzin and Lincoln (1994), who stated that “no [quantitative] trustworthiness quotient 
can be developed” (p. 151). Smith suggested several methods by which the trustworthiness of 
qualitative research may be assessed, for example independent audit (i.e., the data are presented to 
one or more experts whose role is to check that the final analysis is credible); member validation 
(i.e., allowing one or more of the respondents in the study to review, and comment upon, the 
analysis); and presentation of evidence (i.e., enough of the raw is presented to allow the reader to 
investigate the interpretations being made).  
Independent audit of non-academic responses. Two authorities on the psychology of 
emotion and mood audited our initial analysis (i.e., the classification of raw data themes into higher 
order themes and these into dimensions). A consensus analysis of the opinions of the two 
independent auditors and the initial analysis was then conducted. This process initially yielded 
multiple differences in opinion, which although suggesting that analyses were free from excessive 
theoretical alignment, arguably indicated that our initial analysis might have been problematic.  
Several approaches could have been used to align the three views. For example, a simple 
inter-rater reliability statistic could have been calculated, and only those parts of the analysis where 
80% or above agreement was evident retained. However, Smith (1995) warned that the role of the 
independent auditors is not to ensure that the original analysis is the only definitive account of the 
data, but that the analysis is credible and warranted based on the data collected and conclusions 
drawn. It was evident that many of the discrepancies between the three views related to the criteria 
of cause and awareness of cause, specifically, that both external auditors tended to group responses 
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relating to the two criteria together, whilst the authors explicitly distinguished between them. We 
discussed these discrepancies with the auditors, and it was agreed that, given the objective of our 
research, and our argument that, like emotion, mood has a cause, but one that may be obscure to the 
person experiencing it (see below), our perspective was perhaps most appropriate to the analysis in 
question.  
Several other areas of disagreement were evident relating to structural criteria, especially 
those of „duration‟, „timing‟, and „stability‟. For example, the statement “An emotion can be more 
reactive and spontaneous”, was classified differently by the auditors and the authors (as relating to 
the themes of stability and timing respectively). In such cases, where classifying distinctions often 
seemed more a semantic than conceptual problem, the authors accepted an inter-rater reliability of 
above 66% (i.e., agreement between two of three of the views). A similar process was adopted with 
several other differences of opinion between author and auditors.  
Member validation. The second step in demonstrating the trustworthiness of the analysis 
above was via member validation. Two of the initial respondents were asked to assess the accuracy 
of the consensual analysis derived through the independent audit above. The two respondents were 
selected on the basis that they had both submitted detailed and comprehensive responses to the 
research question. It was thus hypothesized that their evaluation of our analysis of their own 
responses may not only shed light on the accuracy of these analyses, but that subsequent discussion 
would facilitate their understanding of the analysis process, enabling a reliable evaluation of the 
narratives of other respondents. Having checked our analysis of their own responses, the two 
respondents were asked to check one in five of the remaining responses (this policy was 
implemented in order to assess any general trends in agreement or disagreement with our analysis 
before asking the two respondents to complete the lengthy process for all responses). Neither 
respondent disagreed with any aspect of our initial analysis. Although Smith (1996) argued that 
such high levels of agreement are not unusual in member validation, proposing that factors such as 
the power relations between researcher and participant may play a major part, we were presented 
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with a problem, whether to press the respondents for a re-analysis of their original overview, or 
whether to accept it at face value. A decision to leave the analysis as it stood was taken on the basis 
that pressing the two individuals further may (a) place them under pressure to find differences that 
perhaps they believed did not really exist, and (b) may have been seen to imply an expert/novice 
distinction between researcher and respondent, that is, the researchers would have in effect been 
telling the respondent that their initial analysis was incorrect.  
Presentation of evidence. To further demonstrate the trustworthiness of our analysis, raw 
data and subsequent analyses are presented in Table 1. The authors will be pleased to submit all raw 
data collected and the resultant classification of these data into higher order themes to any interested 
reader.  
Content analysis of the academic literature 
The content analysis of the academic literature was conducted on 65 published works from 
the psychology, psychiatry and philosophy literature. Sources for this literature were (a) searches of 
the electronic databases PsychINFO and Medline using the keywords emotion, mood, affect and 
feeling; (b) manual searches of the reference lists of all works found through process (a); and (c) an 
extensive manual search of psychology and philosophy texts in the libraries of several London 
universities.  
Although the literature search was extensive and thorough, it is unlikely that the literature 
analyzed in the present paper represents the entire body of published work relating to the subject. 
For example, several citations were found by chance; that is, they were either not referenced in the 
sources listed above or were in papers relating to other disciplines (e.g., Elster, 1996). The fact that 
these papers were not referenced in relation to emotion and mood in any of the above databases or 
sources hints at the possibility that other relevant information may have been published but not 
found in our search. Although the academic literature analyzed in the present study may not be 
complete, a similar level of saturation was evident in the 65 academic citations as was evident in the 
non-academic responses. That is, despite increasing numbers of citations, the same themes tended to 
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be used by authors to distinguish emotion from mood. It was judged unlikely that increasing the 
quantity of the citations would have increased the quality of the data.  
Trustworthiness of analysis of academic literature 
Initially, it was considered that as all the papers included in the present analysis were peer 
reviewed, published, and apparently unambiguous in their conclusions about emotion-mood 
distinctions, it was unnecessary to address the trustworthiness of this particular content analysis. 
However, a reviewer
4
 of an earlier draft of the present paper indicated that s/he did not agree with 
our classification of a specific citation. This indicated to us that perhaps the literature is not as 
unambiguous as we supposed, and that some evidence of trustworthiness was required. In this case, 
using all three of Smith‟s (1995) criteria to demonstrate trustworthiness was problematic. Although 
we used two independent psychologists to audit our analysis, the second process, member checking, 
was deemed to be inappropriate. Firstly, such a process would have involved contacting each of the 
65 authors cited in order to ascertain whether, in their opinion, we had correctly interpreted their 
work. Secondly, we judged this process unnecessary given that Smith‟s third criterion, presentation 
of evidence, is satisfied; that is, all citations in the analysis have been published and our analyses 
are reported below.  
Smith (1995) proposed that no analysis can be deemed the only definitive account of the 
data, and that the role of auditors is to ensure that the analysis is credible and warranted based on 
the data collected and conclusions drawn. In other words, it may be unavoidable that at times our 
interpretation of the criteria proposed by a specific author to distinguish between emotion and mood 
in the literature may differ slightly from that author‟s own interpretation. We argue instead that the 
interested reader is able to verify the inferences and conclusions we drew by referring to the 
literature, and that satisfactory trustworthiness is demonstrated.  
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Non-academic distinctions between emotion and mood 
Given the open-ended nature of the question posed to respondents, predictably there was a 
wide range in both length of response (from 7 – 827 words) and the level of detail provided. As 
stated above, in the first stage of analysis, statements relating directly to the research question were 
identified and separated from more general statements. In the second stage of analysis, raw data 
items were grouped into higher order themes. Many of the distinctions mentioned by respondents 
did not fall readily into any of these predetermined categories, and consequently an inductive 
process was used to classify these responses into a further eight higher order themes, which were 
labeled as anatomy, clarity, controllability, display, experience, stability, timing, and valence
5
. It is 
evident that several of the higher order themes are related to each other conceptually, thus the third 
stage of the analysis was to group higher order themes with similar characteristics into general 
dimensions. Fourteen of the 16 higher order themes were grouped into five general dimensions. 
Selected raw data items, higher order themes, and general dimensions derived from the analysis are 
shown in Table 1.  
Academic distinctions between emotion and mood 
Eight higher order themes were identified from a content analysis of 65 published articles 
that included criteria to distinguish emotion from mood. The eight themes were intensity, duration, 
physiology, cause, awareness of cause, consequences, function, and intentionality. Table 2 shows 
the themes cited in each article. The number of distinguishing characteristics cited ranged from 1 to 
5, with a mean of 2.3. The majority of articles (59%) cited two or three distinctions between 
emotion and mood but precise distinctions varied widely across papers. It is apparent, with different 
authors citing usually two or three of eight criteria that, to date, there has been limited consensus in 
the literature as to which specific criteria distinguish emotion from mood. However, there is a 
degree of consensus about the nature of each individual criterion (e.g., most theorists who cite 
                                            
5
 It is acknowledged that some of these additional themes have been addressed in the literature but not cited specifically as criteria by which to 
distinguish emotion from mood. For example, valence (i.e., whether feelings are positive or negative) forms one dimension of several bio-
psychological models of mood (e.g., Russell, 1980; Larsen & Diener, 1992) but is not proposed to make mood distinctive from emotion.   
Emotion-Mood Distinctions 
16 
duration as a criterion agree that moods endure longer than emotions, a notable exception being 
Lazarus, 1994). 
Quantitative comparison of academic and non-academic perspectives 
A percentage-wise comparison of academic and non-academic perspectives on emotion-
mood distinctions is presented in Table 3. This indicates a fair degree of correspondence between 
academic and non-academic perspectives on emotion-mood distinctions. It can be seen that among 
non-academics, cause (65% of respondents), duration (40%), control (25%), experience (15%) and 
consequences (14%) were the most frequently cited criteria, whereas among academics, duration 
(62% of authors), intentionality (41%) cause (31%), consequences (31%) and function (18%) were 
the most frequently proposed criteria. When the eight themes cited by both academics and non-
academics were ranked according to frequency of citation, more than 60% overlap in opinion about 
emotion-mood distinctions was evident (rho = .78; p < .05).  
It was equally apparent, however, that non-academics proposed several distinctions not 
generally found in the literature. For example, several participants in the present study proposed that 
emotions are usually displayed or expressed behaviorally whereas moods are not. Although 
behavioral displays are frequently discussed in the literature as a feature of emotion (e.g., Ekman, 
1994) and lack of display has been discussed in relation to mood (e.g., Davidson, 1994), no author 
has proposed explicitly that degree of display distinguishes emotion from mood.  
Qualitative comparison of academic and non-academic perspectives 
The qualitative comparison focused on identifying contextual differences between emotion 
and mood by analyzing respondents‟ comments in more detail. The results of this comparison are 
presented for each higher order theme.   
Cause. Cause was the distinguishing feature most frequently cited by non-academics and the 
second most frequently cited in the psychology literature. Perhaps the most representative non-
academic response was “Moods are general, background feeling states, with no specific cause or 
direction. Emotions have a specific cause and are directed at a specific object. For example, you 
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might experience an emotion because of someone. When you are not with them or thinking about 
them the emotion goes, but might return when you see them/think about them again.” Other 
responses included “Mood is a long-term state of mind/being [that] can be altered by an emotion. 
Emotion is a reaction to some trigger” and “Emotions are more spontaneous reactions/feelings…, 
whilst a mood is more governed by the brain and is normally a reaction to a cumulative sequence of 
events.” Responses were generally consistent with opinions expressed in the literature, such as the 
definition provided by Parkinson et al. (1996) that “Emotions are caused by specific events 
localized in time, whereas moods build up as a consequence of either a concatenation of minor 
incidents, persistent conditions in the environment, and/or internal metabolic or cognitive 
processes” (p. 6).  
Duration. Duration was cited as distinguishing emotion from mood by 40% of respondents 
and 62% of authors in the psychology literature. The most representative non-academic response 
was probably that “An emotion is experienced for an instant, a mood can last for ages” or that 
“Emotions can come and go far quicker than moods, my emotions are quick flashes of light, they 
are feeling generated from experiences and events. Moods however are fare more prolonged, and 
depending on an individual‟s strength of character a mood could last all day or longer.” These 
views are consistent with opinion in the literature where most authorities agree that moods endure 
longer than emotions.  
However, a small percentage of respondents proposed that emotions endure longer than 
moods. One respondent stated, “A mood is transient where an emotion is more long lasting. For 
example, you may be in a bad mood for a few hours but the mood will pass, if you have the emotion 
of anger about something you are likely to remain angry for a considerable period of time.” 
Although this statement may be interpreted as a reference to repeated occurrences of the emotion of 
anger rather than one enduring emotion episode, it is lent some credibility by Lazarus (1994), who 
noted that the respective duration of emotion and mood is not a reliable criterion by which to 
distinguish the two constructs. 
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Control. More than a quarter of respondents cited control as distinguishing between emotion 
and mood. Indeed several respondents saw control as a central distinction (e.g., “I would define 
emotion as a temporary lack of control”). Possibly the most representative response was, “An 
emotion is something you cannot control, you just feel it: sorrow, joy, etc. A mood is something 
you can modify if you want to do so, you can decide to be in a bad mood or you can decide that 
what happened does not matter and stay in a good mood.” Further responses included “Moods are 
easier to control whereas emotion is more instinctive and less controlled by reason” and “Emotions 
are far harder to control, since they are a reaction to an event”.  
This criterion has not been explicitly proposed in the psychology literature, although control 
has been extensively examined in relation to emotion (see for example Ekman & Davidson, 1994, 
pp. 65-281), and in relation to mood management (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988; Mayer, Mamberg & 
Volanth, 1988; Mayer, Salovey, Gomberg-Kaufmann, & Blainey, 1991; see Parkinson et al., 1996, 
for a review). Although the question of whether emotions are controllable is still being addressed 
(see Ekman & Davidson, 1994), the controllability of everyday, non-pathological moods is 
generally accepted; indeed the literature on the efficacy of mood regulation is extensive (see for 
example Morris, 1989; Parkinson et al., 1996; Thayer, 1996).  
Experience. About 16% of respondents equated emotions with feelings and mood with 
thoughts. Their responses included “In short, think a mood, feel an emotion” and “When I am in a 
certain mood it has more to do with the way I am thinking. When I experience a certain emotion it 
has more to do with the way I am feeling.” This criterion it is not explicitly cited as a distinction in 
the psychology literature although many authors have made links between the mind and mood, and 
between the body, or at least somatic processes, and emotion; links which could be said to imply 
mood-thought and emotion-feeling relationships. However, several authors have argued that all 
emotional responses are preceded by cognitive processes (e.g., Lazarus, 1999). Further, all holistic 
approaches to human functioning downplay such dualistic mind-body distinctions that have 
troubled philosophers and psychologists for centuries. Nevertheless, the experience of feeling 
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versus thinking is a criterion used by people to distinguish their emotions from their moods, and 
thus should be of interest to those seeking to understand these constructs.  
Consequences. Fifteen percent of respondents proposed that emotion and mood have 
different consequences, as did 31% of authors in the psychology literature. Typical responses 
included “One can experience many different emotions about different things at once but these do 
not cloud judgment in the same way a mood can”. Other comments, such as “Emotion a cause, 
mood an effect” and “A mood is the result of an emotion”, in which moods are seen to be the 
consequence of emotions, clearly hint at a transactional relationship between emotion and mood. 
These responses are consistent with the literature, where different consequences for emotions and 
moods have been proposed. For example, Davidson (1994) argued that mood biases cognition 
whereas emotion biases behavior; Frijda (1994) argued that emotions alter action readiness whereas 
moods produce generalized cognitive consequences; and Oatley and Jenkins (1992) argued that 
emotions serve to rearrange the priorities of goals and change the flow of action, whereas moods 
maintain a distinctive readiness that continues despite events that might disturb it. The notion that 
the autonomic activity associated with emotion prepares the organism for activity (e.g., the fight or 
flight response) whereas moods influence cognitive processes such as information processing and 
memory, is widely espoused. Respondents and psychologists alike frequently mentioned the 
concept of mood coloring our cognitive and perceptual processes (e.g., Clore, 1994, Ruckmich, 
1936, Whybrow, 1997).  
Display. Fifteen percent of respondents cited differences in the way the emotion and mood 
are displayed as a distinguishing feature of the two states. This criterion has not received significant 
attention in the psychology literature, although, as stated above, there is a body of research on the 
expression of emotion. The most representative non-academic response was “Emotions are public 
and moods are personal”. Further responses included “[Emotions] are more visible to others, with 
emotions clearly being seen through the eyes. They are very hard to hide… [mood] can be hidden 
from other people,” a response which also hints at the relative controllability of emotion, and “A 
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mood is something you suffer and an emotion is something you display”. There is clearly some 
crossover between the criteria of display and control; the implication being that mood, which can be 
more readily controlled than emotion, can therefore be more easily hidden.   
Respondents‟ views on the relative visibility of emotions and moods were largely in accord 
with the literature. Research into the expression of emotion goes back at least to Darwin‟s (1872) 
The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, although there has been comparatively little 
work on the expression of mood per se. There is general consensus in the literature that specific 
emotions have corresponding facial expressions whereas specific moods do not (see Ekman, 1994) 
although some researchers have proposed that moods are instead expressed via bodily posture (e.g., 
Parkinson et al., 1996). It has also been acknowledged that mood changes may be signaled by non-
visible, yet measurable, changes in facial muscle tone.  
Intentionality. Although none used the term „intentionality‟, 13% of respondents cited the 
object-relatedness of emotion compared to the lack of relatedness of mood. This compares with 
41% of contributors to the psychology literature. Non-academic responses included “Emotion is 
usually aimed at something such as love/hate for a particular person, whereas mood is simply a 
general background state of mind, which is not wholly rationally explained and it is not aimed at 
anything in particular” and “Moods are general, background feeling states, with no specific cause or 
direction. Emotions have a specific cause and are directed at a specific object.” These responses are 
consistent with the literature, where it has been proposed that emotions are always about, or 
directed at, something (i.e., they are intentional) whilst moods may not be. Frijda (1994) argued that 
whereas one is angry (an emotion) about or at something, we tend to be irritable (a mood) non-
specifically. Parkinson et al. (1996) also suggested that whilst moods are unfocused, emotions are 
directed at specific objects. In relation to the cause criterion discussed earlier, Parkinson et al. added 
that emotions are directed at specific objects rather than necessarily caused by specific objects, and 
that the cause and the object may not necessarily be the same.   
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Anatomy. Twelve percent of respondents cited differences in the anatomical location of 
emotion and mood. This distinction has not been cited explicitly in the literature, although the link 
noted previously between moods and thoughts (implicitly located in the brain), and emotions and 
feelings (arguably located elsewhere) resonates the same message. Non-academic responses 
included “Emotions are in the heart and mood is in the head,” “Emotions …are pre-determined by 
the heart, whilst a mood is more governed by the brain,” and “An emotion comes from the heart, 
psyche, or soul … one could argue that mood comes from the mind.”  Parenthetically, 28% of 
respondents also described mood as either a “state of mind” or a “frame of mind.”  
There is certainly a wealth of literature describing the somatic correlates of emotion. In fact, 
it was proposed as far back as James (1898) that physiological processes might be the defining part 
of the emotion process. Similarly, the close relationship between mood and cognition has been well 
researched and documented. However, despite the mind-mood and body-emotion associations in the 
literature, it appears that respondents in the present study were identifying a genuine anatomical 
distinction between emotion and mood rather than simply emphasizing different aspects of human 
functioning.  
Intensity. Twelve percent of respondents proposed that emotions are more intense than 
moods, compared to 17% of authors in the literature. Typical responses included “Moods are 
generally less intense than emotions” and “My emotions are always much stronger than my 
moods”. Exactly the same sentiments have been expressed in the literature. Mandler (1983), for 
example, described mood as “a persisting state of low level emotion” (p. 145); Lang (1988) 
described moods, in relation to emotions, as “less intense but more persistent states of feeling” (p. 
178); and Panksepp (1994) referred to the arousal associated with mood as “milder and more 
sustained” (p. 86) than that associated with emotion.  
Timing. Nine percent of non-academic respondents cited temporal differences between 
emotion and mood. Responses included “A mood, I believe, is not as instantaneous as an emotion” 
and “I think an emotion is an instinctive feeling that is felt fairly immediately in response to a 
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stimulus… It generally won‟t last long, for example, a „pang of jealousy‟ would be an emotion. A 
mood, in contrast, would last longer, and would not generally be an immediate response to 
something.” 
Timing has also been cited in the literature as a distinguishing feature between emotion and 
mood. For example, Parkinson et al. (1996) proposed that “Emotions usually seem to have a clear 
moment of onset then dissipate fairly rapidly, whereas moods often change more slowly and 
continue to linger somewhere in the background of consciousness (p. 5). However, as a criterion in 
the literature, timing is often subsumed under the duration or intensity criteria. Although it is 
proposed that the onset and decay of moods may be gradual whilst those of an emotion are 
instantaneous, it is possible that the onset of mood is also instantaneous but its initial and final 
intensities are below the threshold of conscious awareness of the individual.  
Physiology. Seven percent of respondents alluded to differences in the physiology of the two 
states. Respondents generally proposed that emotion is more closely associated with physiological 
processes than mood, rather than proposing that each is associated with different physiological 
responses. Typical responses included “A particular emotion occurs through a physical chemical 
response/reaction e.g., adrenaline/fear” and “Moods are very much determined by psychological 
and hormonal influences.” Eight percent of authors in the literature made a similar point. 
Interestingly, mirroring the views of respondents to the present study, the literature has also tended 
to focus on the physiology of emotion or mood as opposed to proposing distinct physiological 
responses for each. Ketai (1975), Vallerand and Blanchard (2000) and Watson and Clark (1994) all 
addressed emotion-mood distinctions but only mentioned physiology in relation to emotion, whilst 
Ekman (1994) mentioned only the physiology of mood. Panksepp (1994) did address both 
constructs but referred to the physiology of mood simply as low levels of arousal in “emotional and 
affective systems”.  
Stability. Seven percent of respondents suggested that the respective stability of instances of 
emotion and mood distinguished between the two. Responses included “An emotion may be 
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experienced over a shorter time frame than a mood, in that it may be fleeting, sudden, or easily 
induced/altered/influenced” and “One minute I can be in a great mood and then the smallest thing 
can change my mood, other people, unless they know me very well wouldn‟t notice my mood 
changes, but I can‟t hide my emotions. My emotions tend to be more powerful, but more constant.” 
It is evident from these responses that, whereas some respondents believed that emotion was more 
stable than mood, others believed the opposite was true. A stability criterion is not cited explicitly in 
the literature although, as with the criterion of timing, there are strong links with the more 
frequently addressed criteria of duration and intensity. In the literature, it is frequently argued that, 
whereas emotions are acute and phasic episodes, moods, which are sustained and enduring, are ever 
present and we are constantly in a mood of one sort or other (Mandler, 1983; Parkinson et al., 1996; 
Watson & Clark, 1994). 
Awareness of cause. Four percent of respondents cited awareness of cause as a 
distinguishing feature compared to 13% of authors in the literature. Probably the most 
representative non-academic responses were “Sometimes one might be in a 'bad' mood or a 'good' 
mood but not always be able to explain why. Normally, an emotion can be linked to a specific 
thing” and “An emotion is usually driven by an identifiable source, where a mood is seemingly 
unrelated to circumstance”. These proposals can be seen to represent a very similar perspective to 
those in the literature. For example, Ekman (1994) argued “People can usually specify the event 
that called forth an emotion, and often cannot do so for a mood” (p. 57). Similarly, Brehm (1999) 
suggested that while emotions result from specific instigators moods can occur without apparent 
cause; and Russell and Feldman-Barrett (1999) proposed that, compared to emotion which is highly 
object-focused, mood represents “free-floating affect … subject to many causes from specific 
events such as the weather to diurnal cycles, some of which are beyond the human capacity to 
detect” (p. 806). In addition, Ekman and Davidson (1994) stated that “Growing evidence does 
suggest that when an emotion is elicited outside conscious awareness, the emotion that is generated 
has different consequences compared with contexts in which the eliciting stimuli are conscious” (p. 
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299), implying that whether a feeling is experienced as either an emotion or a mood is dependent on 
the context in which this feelings is experienced.  
It is important to note the distinction between the cause and awareness of cause criteria. The 
cause distinction implies that the emotions and moods have different causes; for example, a 
perceived obstacle to achieving a goal in the case of the emotion of anger, and the combined effects 
of factors such as tiredness, hunger, and repeated minor irritations in the case of the related mood of 
irritability. To distinguish emotion from mood via awareness of cause (continuing the above 
example), the individual would be aware of what is preventing goal attainment, whereas the 
individual would not necessarily be aware that tiredness, hunger, and minor irritations are 
combining to influence mood. In summary, there is a degree of consensus between respondents and 
academics that emotions result from causes the individual is aware of whist moods may occur 
without apparent cause.  
Clarity. Three percent of respondents cited clarity as a distinction between emotion and 
mood. Typical responses included “Mood is … a little less defined, I could never describe a mood 
as precisely as I could an emotion,” “A mood is something that is more underlying – perhaps more 
intangible and less easy to explain,” and “Emotions are also more identifiable and pigeonholeable 
(sic) whereas moods tend to be more nebulous and abstracted.” Although clarity is not a criterion 
used explicitly in the literature, arguably it is implied by the terms used to describe emotion and 
mood. For example, words like “diffuse” (Averill & Nunley, 1992; Ewert, 1970; Frijda, 1994; 
Parkinson et al., 1996; Schwarz & Clore, 1988; Vallerand & Blanchard, 2000), “vague” (Averill & 
Nunley, 1992), and “unfocused” (Parkinson et al., 1996) have been used to describe mood, whereas 
emotions have been described as, for example, “distinct” (Watson & Clark, 1994), “focused” 
(Frijda, 1994; Parkinson et al., 1996; Solomon, 1976), and “organized” (Averill & Nunley, 1992; 
Watson & Clark, 1984). As part of the structural dimension (which also includes duration, intensity, 
timing, and stability) it is possible that mood‟s lack of clarity may be a function of its low intensity 
or gradual onset. 
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Function. Although several respondents cited the respective functions of emotion and mood 
as a distinguishing characteristic, none described what the distinct functions of emotion and mood 
might be (one respondent in fact proposed that mood has no function). This is at odds with the 
literature, where authors have proposed that emotions bias action and moods bias cognition 
(Davidson, 1994) or that mood signals the state of the self whereas emotion signals the state of the 
world (Morris, 1992; see also Clore, 1994; Watson & Clark, 1994; Frijda, 1994; Mandler, 1984; 
Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Lazarus (1994) similarly argued that 
emotions refer to “the immediate adaptational business in an encounter with the environment, the 
fate of a specific and narrow goal that confronts a beneficial or harmful (or threatening) 
environmental condition” whilst moods are “products of appraisals of the existential background of 
our lives” (p.84). It may be in fact be argued that emotion and mood, like all psychological 
processes, share the same ultimate function, that is, to help the organism adapt and survive in an 
ever-changing environment. Given that we cannot observe, measure or evaluate function but can 
only speculate as to what it may be, and because function is unlikely to form the basis of a useable 
criterion by which to distinguishing emotion from mood, its utility as a criterion by which to 
distinguish emotion from mood is questionable.  
Valence. The valence theme also presented a problem conceptually. A small number of 
respondents opined that emotion is always positive and mood is always negative. This ran counter 
to the majority view expressed in the present study -- many respondents referred to “being in a good 
mood” -- and to the widely accepted views in the literature that fear, a negative feeling, represents a 
prototypical emotion. This example highlights the caution required when investigating common 
sense theories, and the need to speculate about potential reasons for such beliefs. In this case for 
example, if a child were brought up with an irritable, bad tempered brother, and an easily overjoyed 
and excitable sister, and these two siblings were described respectively as moody and emotional by 
their parents, the individual in question may conceptualize mood as negative and emotion as 
positive; an idiosyncratic common sense theory that may persist into adulthood.  
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Table 4 shows a summary of emotion-mood distinctions derived from the responses of 
participants and the views expressed in the literature. This summary represents the majority views 
of those who cited specific distinctions between emotion and mood.  
Discussion 
The present study investigated if and how a non-academic population distinguished between 
emotion and mood, and then established the extent of correspondence between these non-academic 
perspectives and academic theories. Results showed that participants described emotion and mood 
as distinct phenomena in terms of how they were manifested in phenomenal experience, and how 
they impacted on behavior. Although 16 different distinctions were reported, considerable 
agreement was evident among respondents about the nature of the differences. For example, most 
participants who cited controllability as a distinction agreed that emotion is less controllable than 
mood. Similarly, authors in the academic literature, although not agreeing on the specific criteria by 
which to distinguish emotion from mood, tended to agree on the direction of the various 
distinctions. Moreover, academic and non-academic views were also generally in accord about the 
direction of emotion-mood differences, agreeing that emotions are more intense, brief, volatile, etc. 
than moods (see Table 4).  
The data and subsequent analyses reported above are, within reason, relatively simple to 
interpret. The aim of the present paper was to present data that should prove useful to investigators 
interested in developing a clearer scientific distinction between emotion and mood than is currently 
available. As such, we feel that to go beyond the presentation and tentative analyses of these data 
by, for example, arguing for the adoption of certain criteria, would be conjectural.  
There are two potential limitations to findings from the present study. The first is their 
potentially unscientific foundation and, second, the potential discrepancy between language and 
reality. In relation to the first perspective, Averill (1996) suggested that scientific theories are often 
“little more than folk theories, clothed in the scientific jargon of the time” (p. 24). If this proposal is 
true -- and the lack of empirical data relating to emotion and mood distinctions hints that it may be -
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- it is interesting that several of the non-academic distinctions go beyond those described in the 
scientific literature. If academic theories are indeed founded on folk theories, logically, the fact that 
psychologists have not explicitly adopted these particular conceptions as potential distinctions 
between emotion and mood could imply that these are in some way deemed implausible or 
unscientific. Take for example the criterion display, a criterion proposed by several non-academics 
respondents but not evident in the academic literature. Some participants clearly viewed the 
tendency for emotions to be displayed and moods not to be displayed as an important distinguishing 
feature. However, the degree of display may be seen by psychologists as being as much a 
consequence of factors such as personality, situation, or societal norms, as any intrinsic 
characteristic of emotion or mood per se.  
Several authors have criticized the use of folk theory in developing a scientific account of 
mental states. For example, Churchland (1981) argued that folk theories of mental states are based 
on a false premise and should be replaced with theories drawn from human neuroscience. Similarly, 
Parkinson (1995) suggested: 
If people represent emotional reality accurately, then it makes sense to make use of their 
representations when trying to get at the underlying phenomenon, but if their representations 
are distorted in any way, then psychologists relying on self-reports are in danger of 
developing theories based on emotional ideology instead of emotional reality. (p. 347) 
It was highlighted when discussing the valence theme that an individual‟s idiosyncratic beliefs 
about psychological phenomena could easily be based on erroneous information (e.g., the adjectives 
emotional and moody having been used by parents to describe the respective temperaments of their 
children). Clearly the basis for any folk theory must be critically evaluated before it is incorporated 
into any scientific theory.  
In relation to the second potential limitation -- the nature of the relationship between 
language and reality -- folk psychology theories posit that the phenomena they describe exist in a 
real world, and are independent of the phenomena they describe. This position is well summarized 
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by Frijda, Markam, Sato, and Wiers (1995) who argued that “there are phenomena for which the 
word „emotion‟ has been invented, and which phenomena existed prior to the word having been 
invented” (p. 121). If we adopt such a realist philosophical stance, we can assume that folk theories 
are based on peoples‟ descriptions of pre-existing, biological, phenomena. A logical deduction from 
this argument would be that the data above could contribute to a scientific taxonomy of emotion and 
mood.  
However, several authors have questioned this account. For example, Parkinson (1998) 
suggested “the culturally-provided representational template that is imposed on psychological 
reality determines the conceptual entities that are discerned there… So nature is carved not at its 
joints but in whatever places societies or institutions are inclined to draw their dividing lines” (p. 
620). Parkinson, while acknowledging biological factors in emotion, hints at strong social factors 
influencing the way we represent emotion, and in doing so, calls into question the realist stance 
described above. 
Debates relating to the respective complexities and merits of these contrasting positions, 
which have occupied psychologists and philosophers for many years, are beyond the scope of the 
present paper. The present paper sought to present and offer a tentative analysis of folk 
psychological distinctions between emotion and mood. These debates are briefly alluded to remind 
the reader that to accept the data above as evidence of valid distinctions between emotion and mood 
requires the acceptance of a certain philosophical stance, and that the validity of that stance is far 
from universally accepted.  
Conclusion  
It is anticipated that the data above, representing as they do an integration of academic and 
lay perspectives, will encourage those working in the area to consider the respective natures of the 
constructs of emotion and mood. It is also hoped that the present findings will stimulate further 
empirical research into emotion-mood distinctions. Several philosophical, conceptual and practical 
questions remain to be answered. First, from a philosophical perspective, what is the relationship 
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between the common sense theories expounded above and the psychological or biological reality of 
emotion and mood? That is, just because people say that emotion and mood exist as distinct entities 
does this mean that they do, or are they simply socially constructed phenomena.  
Second, from a conceptual perspective, are emotions and moods, although distinct in 
manifestation (duration, cause, intensity, etc.), actually the same construct in different guises. Do 
they exist at opposite ends of a single continuum or as two distinct phenomena? Is a mood simply a 
low intensity and enduring emotion? In the words of one respondent “I guess the difference for me 
is the degree to which the original feeling is felt and expressed that makes it either an emotion or a 
mood, but I get the sense that in their original form they may be the same thing.”  
Third, from a practical perspective, which of the 16 criteria should become objects of 
explicit measurement and study in future research? The present results suggest that the duration, 
cause and intentionality criteria might represent the most fruitful avenues for future research but 
whether criterion values can be established where, for example, a particular response duration 
distinguishes a mood from an emotion appears doubtful. 
Although the data presented do not constitute evidence for a distinction between emotion 
and mood based on any specific criterion, they lay an empirical foundation for future research and 
should prove useful to investigators interested in developing a clearer scientific distinction between 
emotion and mood than is currently available. Future research should aim to identify the 
congruence between such folk psychology theories and biological/neurological indices to further 
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Table 1  
Selected Raw Data, Higher Order Themes and General Dimensions of Participants’ Responses 
 
Raw data Higher order theme General 
Dimension 
 
“An emotion can be more reactive and 
spontaneous”  
“A mood, I believe is not instantaneous as an 
emotion”  
“I think an emotion is an instinctive feeling that 
is felt fairly immediately in response to a 
stimulus, … A mood, in contrast, would last 
longer, and would not generally be an 
immediate response to something.” 
“An emotion may be experienced over a 
shorter time frame than a mood, in that it may 
be fleeting, sudden, or easily 
induced/altered/influenced”  
“One minute I can be in a great mood and 
then the smallest thing can change my mood 
…My emotions tend to be more powerful, but 
more constant!!”  
“Mood is a long-term state of mind/being … 
[emotion] is a short-term feeling” 
“Moods are generally less intense than 
emotions and last longer”.  
“An emotion is experienced for an instant, a 
mood can last for ages” 
“Moods are generally less intense than 
emotions”  
“My emotions are always much stronger than 
my moods” 
“Mood is a little longer, and a little less 
defined, I could never describe a mood as 
precisely as I could an emotion”  
“A mood is something that is more underlying 
– perhaps more intangible and less easy to 
explain” 
“Emotions are also more identifiable and 
pigeonholeable whereas moods tend to be 














“moods are very much determined by 
psychological and hormonal influences”  
“A particular emotion is occurs through a 
physical chemical response.” 
“Emotions are in the heart and mood is in the 
head”  
“Emotions are … pre-determined by the heart, 
whilst a mood is more governed by the brain”  
“An emotion comes from the heart, psyche, or 
soul… one could argue that mood comes from 
the mind.”  
 
“Emotion is usually aimed at something (i.e., 
love/hate is for a particular person), whereas 
mood, is simply a general background state of 
mind”  
“An emotion can be a fleeting or brief feeling 
about a single event or about someone or 
something.  A mood is a state of being and 
effects the way someone reacts, performs or 
exists whilst experiencing the mood, be it 
good or bad”  
“Moods are general, background feeling 
states, with no specific … direction.  
Emotions…are directed at a specific object”.  
“Sometimes one might be in a 'bad' mood or a 
'good' mood but not always be able to explain 
why. Normally, an emotion can be linked to a 
specific thing”  
“An emotion is usually driven by an identifiable 
source, where a mood is seemingly unrelated 
to circumstance”  
“…sometimes moods do seem to come on 
their own without any visible cause” 
“In short, think a mood, feel an emotion.”  
“An emotion is a feeling. A mood is a state of 
mind”.  
“When I am in a certain mood it has more to 
do with the way I am thinking. When I 
experience a certain emotion it has more to do 




































“Emotions are public and moods are personal” 
“[Emotions] are more visible to others… 
[Mood] can be hidden from other people. 
“A mood is something you suffer and an 
emotion is something you display.”  
 
“Moods are easier to control … emotion is 
more instinctive and less controlled by reason”  
“Emotions are far harder to control, since they 
are a reaction to an event”  
“An emotion is something you cannot control, 
you just feel it: sorrow, joy, etc. A mood is 
something you can modify if you want to do 
so, you can decide to be in a bad mood or you 
can decide that what happened does not 
matter and stay in a good mood.” 
 
“One can experience many different emotions 
about different things at once but not these do 
not cloud judgement in the same way a mood 
can”  
“Emotion a cause. Mood an effect.”  
“A mood is the result of an emotion” 
“Mood is a long-term state of mind/being 
[which] can be altered by an emotion. Emotion 
is a reaction to some trigger”  
“Emotions are more spontaneous 
reactions/feelings… [a mood] is normally a 
reaction to a cumulative sequence of events”. 
“Moods are general, background feeling 
states, with no specific cause or direction.  
Emotions have a specific cause” 
“Emotions have purpose – if we feel an 
emotion as a result of certain factors in our 
environment, the emotion is intended to tell us 
something.”  
“A mood may be described as a pervading 
backdrop or undercurrent to a person’s 
perspective/behaviour/outlook, etc. An 
emotion may be more evident, and at the 




























“I associate the word mood with (bad) mood 
more often than (good) mood”. 
“I generally see an emotion as being positive - 
a mood has more negative connotations”.   
“Emotions can be both negative and positive 




Table 2  
Distinctions between Emotion and Mood from the Literature  
Author and year Int Dur Phy Cau Awa Con Fun In 
Alder (1999)  *  *     
Alpert and Rosen (1990)  *   *    
Averill and Nunley (1992)      *  * 
Batson et al. (1992)       *  
Berkowitz (2000) * *      * 
Biddle (2000)    *    * 
Bless & Schwarz (1999) *   *    * 
Brehm (1999)  *  * *   * 
Clore (1994)  *  *   * * 
Colman (2001)
2
  *      * 
Crawford et al. (1992)    *     
Damasio (1999)  *  *    * 
Davidson (1994)       *  
Ekman (1994)  *   *    
Ekman (1999)  *  *     
Ellis & Moore (1999) * *  *    * 
Elster (1996)      *   
Elster (2000)        * 
Evans (2001)  *       
Ewalt, Strecker, & Ehaugh (1957)  *   *    
Ewert (1970)    *    * 
Fish (1967)   *       
Frijda (1994)       * * 
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Author and year Int Dur Phy Cau Awa Con Fun In 
Goldsmith (1994)        * 
Isen (1984)        * 
Kagan (1994a)  *  *  *   
Kagan (1994b)  *  *  *   
Kaplan and Sadock (1986)   *       
Ketai (1975)  * *      
Kolb and Brodie (1982)  *       
Lane and Terry (2000) * *       
Lang (1988) * *    *  * 
Lazarus (1984)  *      * 
Lazarus (1994)    *   * * 
Leshner (1977)  *  *  *  * 
Levenson (1994)  * * *     
Lormand (1985)  *  *    * 
Lormand (1996)      *  * 
Mandler (1983) * *    *   
Mandler (1984)  *    * *  
Manstead et al. (1999)
2
 *   *  *  * 
Morris (1992)    *   *  
Nowlis & Nowlis (1956)    *    * 
Oatley and Jenkins (1992)  *  *   *  
Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987)  *     *  
Ortony (1988)    *     
Ortony, et al. (1987)       *  
Panksepp (1994) * * *      
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Author and year Int Dur Phy Cau Awa Con Fun In 
Parkinson (1994)  *  * *    
Parkinson, et al. (1996) * *     * * 
Power and Dalgleish (1997)       *   
Ruckmick (1936)  *   * *   
Russell and Feldman-Barrett (1999)     * *  * 
Ryle (1949)      *   
Schimmack & Siemer (1998)
1
         * 
Schwarz and Clore (1988)  *  *    * 
Simon (1982)  *    *   
Solomon (1976)        * 
Thayer (1996)      *  * 
Vallerand & Blanchard (2000) * * *   *  * 
Watson and Clark (1994)  * * *     
Watson and Clark (1997) * *       
Wessman & Ricks (1966)    *    * 
Wessman (1979) * *   * *  * 
Whybrow (1997)  *    *   
Note. Int = Intensity; Dur = Duration; Phy = Physiology; Cau = Cause; Awa = Awareness of cause; 
Con = Consequences; Fun = Function; In = Intentionality.  
1 
= Distinctions based on empirical 
research
 2 
= Dictionary entry.  Where an author‟s name appears more than once in Table 2, the 
emotion-mood distinctions expressed are different in each citation listed.  
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Table 3  
Percentage-wise Comparison of Non-academic and Academic Distinctions between Emotion and 
Mood 
Criterion Non-academic Academic 
Cause 65% 31%  
Duration 40% 62%  
Control 25% - 
Experience  15% - 
Consequences 14% 31%  
Display 14% - 
Intentionality 12% 41%  
Anatomy 11% - 
Intensity 11% 17%  
Timing 8% - 
Function 7% 18%  
Physiology 7% 8%  
Stability 7% - 
Awareness of cause 4% 13%  
Clarity 3% - 




Table 4  
Summary of Distinctions between Emotion and Mood 
Criterion Emotion Mood 
Anatomy  Related to the heart Related to the mind 
Awareness of cause  Individual is aware of cause  Individual may be unaware of cause 
Cause Caused by a specific event or object  Cause is less well defined 
Clarity  Clearly defined  Nebulous 
Consequences  Largely behavioral and expressive  Largely cognitive  
Control  Not controllable Controllable 
Display  Displayed  Not displayed 
Duration  Brief Enduring 
Experience  Felt  Thought  
Intensity  Intense Mild 
Intentionality  About something  Not about anything in particular 
Physiology  Distinct physiological patterning  No distinct physiological patterning  
Stability  Fleeting and volatile Stable 
Timing  Rises and dissipates quickly Rises and dissipates slowly 
 
